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Mathematical programming is used to examine the economic potential of greenhouse gas 
mitigation strategies in U.S. agriculture and forestry. Mitigation practices are entered into a 
spatially differentiated sector model and are jointly assessed with conventional agricultural 
production. Competition among practices is examined under a wide range of hypothetical carbon 
prices. Simulation results demonstrate a changing portfolio of mitigation strategies across carbon 
price. For lower prices preferred strategies involve soil and livestock options, higher prices, 
however, promote mainly afforestation and biofuel generation. Results demonstrate the 
sensitivity of individual strategy potentials to assumptions about alternative opportunities. 





Abatement Function, Agricultural Sector Model, Carbon Sequestration, Economic Potential, 
Greenhouse Gas Emission, Mathematical Programming, Multiple Technical Change, Policy 
Simulation 
 
  1Introduction 
  Increasing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and their projected 
consequences, in particular global warming (IPCC, 2001), have caused widespread search for 
feasible remedies. Agriculture has been identified as potential source of low-cost alternatives for 
greenhouse gas emission mitigation during the next few decades (McCarl and Schneider, 2000). 
While U.S. agriculture is a small emitter of the most prevalent greenhouse gas (carbon dioxide - 
CO2), it contributes about 7 percent of total carbon equivalent emissions releasing about 28 
percent of methane emissions and 73 percent of nitrous oxide (U.S. EPA, 2001). Furthermore, 
agriculture has substantial potential for offsetting CO2 emissions by serving as a sink 
augmenting carbon absorption through changes in tillage [Kern (1994), Lal et al., Antle et al. 
(2001b), and Pautsch et al. (2001)] or conversion of cropland to grassland or forest [Adams et al. 
(1993); Plantinga (1999), and Stavins (1999)]. Agriculture can also offset greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by increasing production of energy crops, which can serve either as feedstock for 
electricity generating power plants [McCarl et al. (2000); Schneider and McCarl (2003)] or as 
blend/substitute for fossil fuel based gasoline. 
  Economists and physical scientists have assessed many of the mitigation strategies 
available to the agricultural sector [see McCarl and Schneider (2000) for a review]. However, 
previous assessments are limited in scope neglecting at least one of three major economic 
impacts (Table 1). First, large-scale mitigation efforts in the U.S. agriculture are likely to reduce 
traditional agricultural production, increase associated commodity prices and land values, and 
hence increase farmers' opportunity costs of agricultural GHG emission mitigation. Second, 
simultaneous implementation of strategies, which draw from a common resource base, increases 
the opportunity cost of individual strategies. Third, efforts to lower net emissions of a particular 
greenhouse gas can enhance or reduce emissions of other greenhouse gases. Because many 
agricultural mitigation strategies affect several greenhouse gases simultaneously, their respective 
net abatement cost actually depends on the Global Warming Potential weighted sum of all 
emissions. 
  In this article, we use mathematical programming (MP) for a multi-sector, multi-gas, and 
multi-strategy assessment of agricultural mitigation options taking into account strategy 
competition, market, welfare, and environmental consequences, and regional heterogeneity. 
Details on the MP model structure are given in the next section. Subsequently, we report and 
discuss results from a simulation exercise, where the model is used to estimate agricultural 
abatement functions for GHG emissions and also to examine the consequences of omitting 
alternative mitigation strategy opportunities. 
The U.S. Agricultural Sector and Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Model 
This section documents the essential structure of the U.S. agricultural sector and 
mitigation of greenhouse gas (ASMGHG) model. Here, we focus on the general model structure, 
which is not affected by data updates or model expansion toward greater detail. Data and a 
GAMS version of a regionally aggregated ASMGHG version is available on the Internet. The 
aggregated model can be used to examine and verify the model structure and data and to 
qualitatively replicate the results presented in this article. In representing ASMGHG’s 
mathematical structure, we will use summation notation because it corresponds very closely to 
the ASMGHG computer code. 
ASMGHG is designed to emulate U.S. agricultural decision making along with the 
impacts of agricultural decisions on agricultural markets, the environment, and international 
  2trade. To accomplish this objective, ASMGHG portrays the following key components: natural 
and human resource endowments, agricultural factor (input) markets, primary and processed 
commodity (output) markets, available agricultural technologies, and agricultural policies. 
Because of data requirements and computing feasibilities, sector models cannot provide the same 
level of detail as do farm level or regional models.  Therefore, ASMGHG depicts only 
representative crop and livestock enterprises in 63 aggregated U.S. production regions rather 
than individual farms characteristics. International markets and trade relationships are portrayed 
in 28 international regions. 
Agricultural technologies in the U.S. are represented through Leontief production 
functions specifying fixed quantities of multiple inputs and multiple outputs. Producers can 
choose among several alternative production technologies. Specifically, alternative crop 
production functions arise from combinations of 3 tillage alternatives (conventional tillage, 
conservation tillage, and zero tillage), 2 irrigation alternatives (irrigation, dryland), 4 alternative 
conservation measures (none, contour plowing, strip cropping, terracing), and 3 nitrogen 
fertilization alternatives (current levels, a 15 percent reduction, and a 30 percent reduction) 
specific to each U.S. region, land, and crop type
1. Alternative livestock production functions 
reflect different production intensities, various manure treatment schemes, alternative diets, and 
pasture management for 11 animal production categories and 63 U.S. regions. Processing 
functions identify first or higher level processing opportunities carried out by producers.  
ASMGHG is setup as mathematical programming model and contains more than 20,000 
individual variables and more than 5,000 individual equations. These equations and variables are 
not entered individually but as indexed blocks. All agricultural production activities are specified 
as endogenous variables and denoted here by capital letters. In particular, the variable block 
CROP denotes crop management variables, LUTR = land use transformation, LIVE = livestock 
raising, PROC = processing, and INPS = production factor (input) supply variables. Additional 
variable blocks reflect the dissemination of agricultural products with DOMD = U.S. domestic 
demand, TRAD = U.S. interregional and international trade, FRXS = foreign region excess 
supply, FRXD = foreign region excess demand , EMIT = Emissions, and SEQU = Emission 
reduction or sequestration variables. WELF denotes total agricultural welfare from both U.S. and 
foreign agricultural markets. With the exception of WELF, all variables are restricted be 
nonnegative. 
ASMGHG consists of an objective function, which maximizes total agricultural welfare 
(WELF) and a set of constraining equations, which define a convex feasibility region for all 
variables. Feasible variable levels for all depicted agricultural activities range from zero to an 
upper bound, which is determined by resource limits, supply and demand balances, trade 
balances, and crop rotation constraints
2. Solving ASMGHG involves the task of finding the 
“optimal” level for all endogenous variables subject to compliance with all constraining 
equations. By means of ASMGHG’s objective function, optimal levels of all endogenous 
variables are those levels which maximize agricultural sector based welfare, which is computed 
as the sum of total consumers surplus, producers surplus, and governmental net payments to the 
                                                 
1 We use representative crop production budgets for 63 U.S. regions, 20 crops (cotton, corn, soybeans, 4 wheat 
types, sorghum, rice, barley, oats, silage, hay, sugar cane, sugar beets, potatoes, tomatoes, oranges, grapefruits), 6 
land classes (low erodible cropland, medium erodible cropland, highly erodible cropland, other cropland, pasture, 
and forest) 
2 Crop rotation constraints force the maximum attainable level of an agricultural activity such as wheat production to 
be equal or below a certain fraction of physically available cropland.  
  3agricultural sector minus the total cost of production, transportation, and processing. Basic 
economic theory demonstrates that maximization of the sum of consumers' plus producers' 
surplus yields the competitive market equilibrium as reviewed by McCarl and Spreen. Thus, the 
optimal variable levels can be interpreted as equilibrium levels for agricultural activities under 
given economic, political, and technological conditions.  
To facilitate understanding of the ASMGHG structure, we will start with the description 
of the set of constraining equations and subsequently explain the objective function. Matrix 
coefficients and right hand side values are represented by small letters. Demand and supply 
functions are denoted in italic small letters. Equations, variables, variable coefficients, and right 
hand sight variables may have subscripts indicating indices with index c denoting the set of 
crops, f = production factors with exogenous prices (subset of index w), g = greenhouse gas 
accounts, h = processing alternatives, i = livestock management alternatives, j = crop 
management alternatives, k = animal production type, l = land transformation alternatives, m = 
international region (subset of index r), n = natural or human resource types (subset of index w), 
r = all regions, s = soil classes (subset of index n), t = years, u = U.S. region (subset of index r), 
w = all production factors, and y = primary and processed agricultural commodities. A list of 
individual set elements is available on the Internet or from the authors.  
Supply and demand balance equations for agricultural commodities form an important 
constraint set in ASMGHG, which link agricultural activities to output markets. Specifically, the 
total amount of commodities disseminated in a U.S. region through domestic consumption 
(DOMD), processing (PROC), and exports (TRAD
3) cannot exceed the total amount of 
commodities supplied through crop production (CROP), livestock raising (LIVE), or imports 
(TRAD). Equation block (1) shows the set of commodity supply and demand balance equations 
employed in ASMGHG. Note that equation block (1) is indexed over U.S. regions and 
commodities. Thus, the total number of individual equations equals the product of 63 U.S. 
regions times the 54 primary agricultural commodities.  
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As shown in equation block (1), agricultural commodities can be supplied in each U.S. 
region through crop production activities (if cropping activity  with 
yielda ), livestock production activities (if activity variable   with yield 
), shipments from other U.S. regions (from U.S. region  to u if TR ), or 
foreign imports (from foreign region m to U.S. region u if  ). On the demand side, 
commodities can be used as an input for livestock production (if activity variable LI  
and with usage rate a ), processed (if activity variable   with usage rate 
u,c,s,j CROP 0 >
u, LIVE
u 
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3 While the first index of the USSH and TRAD variables denotes the exporting region or country, the second 




0 ), directly sold in U.S. region u’s market (if  ), shipped to other U.S. 
regions (if  ), or exported to foreign markets (if  ).  
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The coefficients a , a , and a  are unrestricted in sign. While negative signs 
indicate that commodity y is an input for an activity, positive signs indicate outputs. The 
magnitude of these coefficients along with their sign identify either input requirements or output 
yields per unit of activity. The structure of equation block (1) allows for production of multiple 
products and for multi level processing, where outputs of the first process become inputs to the 







  Supply and demand relationships are also specified for agricultural production factors 
linking agricultural activities to production factor markets. As shown in equation block (2), total 
use of production factors by cropping (CROP), livestock (LIVE), land use change (LUTR), and 
processing (PROC) activities must be matched by total supply of these factors (INPS) in each 
region.  













The most fundamental physical constraints on agricultural production arise from the use 
of scarce and immobile resources. Particularly, the use of agricultural land, family labor, 
irrigation water, and grazing units is limited by given regional endowments of these private or 
public resources. In ASMGHG, all agricultural activity variables (CROP, LUTR, LIVE, and 
PROC) have associated with them resource use coefficients (a , a , a , a ), 
which give the quantity of resources needed for producing one unit of that variable. For example, 
most crop production activity variables have a land use coefficient equaling 1. However, land use 
coefficients are greater than 1 for some wheat production strategies, where wheat is preceded by 
fallow. Land use coefficients were also inflated by set aside requirements when analyzing 





The mathematical representation of natural resource constraints in ASMGHG is 
straightforward and displayed in equation block (3). These equations simply force the total use of 
natural or human resources to be at or below given regional resource endowments  u,n b . Note that 
the natural and human resource index n is a subset of the production factor index w. Thus, 
allIN  resource supplies also fall into constraint set (2). The number of individual equations 
in (3) is given by the product of 63 U.S. regions times the number of relevant natural resources 
per region. 
(3)    for all u and n 
  In ASMGHG, trade activities (TR , TR , TR , TR ) by 
international region of destination or origin are balanced through trade equations as shown in 
equation blocks (4) and (5). The equations in block (4) force a foreign region's excess demand 
for an agricultural commodity ( ) to not exceed the sum of all import activities into that 
u,m,y AD
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  5particular region from other international regions ( ) and from the U.S. (TR ). 
Similarly, the equations in block (5) force the sum of all commodity exports from a certain 
international region into other international regions ( ) and the U.S. ( ) to 
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  The number of individual equations in blocks (4) and (5) equals the product of the 
number of traded commodities times the number of international  regions per commodity. 
Because of data limitations only 8 major agricultural commodities are constraint through 
international trade balance equations. More details can be found in Chen and in Chen and 
McCarl. 
  A fifth set of constraints addresses aggregation related aspects of farmers' decision 
process. These constraints force producers’ cropping activities   to fall within a convex 
combination of historically observed choices   [equation (6)]. Based on decomposition and 
economic duality theory (McCarl, Onal and McCarl), it is assumed that observed historical crop 
mixes represent rational choices subject to weekly farm resource constraints, crop rotation 
considerations, perceived risk, and a variety of natural conditions. In (6), the   coefficients 
contain the observed crop mix levels for the past 30 years.  are positive, endogenous 
variables indexed by historical year and region, whose level will be determined during the 
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  The utilization of (6) has several important implications. First, many diverse constraints 
faced by agricultural producers are implicitly integrated. Second, crop choice constraints impose 
an implicit cost for deviating from historical crop rotations. Note that the sum of the CMIX 
variables over time is not forced to add to unity. Therefore, only relative crop shares are 
restricted, allowing the total crop acreage to expand or contract. Third, crop choice constraints 
prevent extreme specialization by adding a substantial number of constraints in each region and 
mimicking what has occurred in those regions. A common problem to large linear programming 
(LP) models is that the number of activity variables by far exceeds the number of constraint 
equations. Because an optimal LP solution will always occur at an extreme point
4 of the convex 
feasibility region, the number of non-zero activity variables cannot exceed the number of 
constraints. Fourth, crop choice constraints are a consistent way of representing a large entity of 
small farms by one aggregate system [Dantzig and Wolfe (1961), Onal and McCarl (1989, 
1991)]. 
  Crop mix constraints are not applied to crops, which under certain policy scenarios are 
expected to expand far beyond the upper bound of historical relative shares. Particularly, if 
 
4 Suppose we have a convex set. A point in this set is said to be an extreme point if it can not be represent as a 
convex combination of any two other points in this set.  
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 , then these crops should not be part of 
the crop mix equations. In ASMGHG, the biofuel crops of switchgrass, poplar and willow fall 
into this category.  
Agricultural land owners do not only have a choice between different crops and different 
crop management strategies, they can also abandon traditional crop production altogether in 
favor of establishing pasture or forest. Equivalently, some existing pasture or forest owners may 
decide to convert suitable land fractions into cropland. In ASMGHG, land use conversions are 
portrayed by a set of endogenous variables LUTR. As shown in (7), certain land conversion can 
be restricted to a maximum transfer  l d , whose magnitude was determined by GIS data on land 
suitability. If  = 0, then constraint (7) is not enforced. In such a case, land use transformations 





u,l u,l d0 LUTR d
≥ ≤   for all u and l 
The assessment of environmental impacts from agricultural production as well as political 
opportunities to mitigate negative impacts is a major application area for ASMGHG. To facilitate 
this task, ASMGHG includes environmental impact accounting equations as shown in (8) and 
(9). For each land management (  and  l), livestock ( ), or processing 
( ) activity, environmental impact coefficients (a ,  ,  ,  ) contain 
the absolute or relative magnitude of those impacts per unit of activity. Negative values of 
greenhouse gas account coefficients, for example,  indicate emission reductions. A detailed 
description of environmental impact categories and their data sources is available in Schneider 
(2000). 
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While the structure of equation blocks (8) and (9) can be used to account for many 
different environmental impacts, special focus was placed in ASMGHG on greenhouse gases. 
GHG emissions and emission reductions are accounted for all major sources, sinks and offsets 
from agricultural activities, for which data were available or could be simulated. Generally, 
ASMGHG considers: 
•  Direct carbon emissions from fossil fuel use (diesel, gasoline, natural gas, heating oil, LP 
gas) in tillage, harvesting, or irrigation water pumping as well as altered soil organic matter 
(cultivation of forested lands or grasslands), 
•  Indirect carbon emissions from fertilizer and pesticide manufacturing, 
•  Carbon savings from increases in soil organic matter (reduced tillage intensity and 
conversion of arable land to grassland) and from tree planting, 
•  Carbon offsets from biofuel production (ethanol and power plant feedstock via production 
of switchgrass, poplar, and willow), 
•  Nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizer usage and livestock manure, 
•  Methane emissions from enteric fermentation, livestock manure, and rice cultivation, 
•  Methane savings from changes in manure and grazing management changes, and  
•  Methane and nitrous oxide emission changes from biomass power plants. 
 
All equations described so far have defined the convex feasibility region for the set of 
agricultural activities. Let us now turn to the objective function. The purpose of this single 
equation is to determine the optimal level of all endogenous variables within the convex 
feasibility region. Applying the McCarl and Spreen (1980) technique, we use a price-
endogenous, welfare based objective function. This equation is shown in (10)
5.  
The left hand side of equation (10) contains the unrestricted total agricultural welfare 
variable (WELF), which is to be maximized. The right hand side of equation (10) contains 
several major terms, which will be explained in more detail below. The first term 
 adds the sum of the areas underneath the inverse U.S. domestic 
demand curves over all crops, livestock products, and processed commodities. ASMGHG can 











5 In displaying the objective function, several modifications have been made to ease readability: a) the integration 
terms are not shown explicitly, b) farm program terms are omitted, and c) artificial variables for detecting 
infeasibilities are omitted. A complete representation of the objective function is available on the Internet or from 
the authors. 
  8or totally elastic demand implying constant prices, c) vertical demand implying fixed demand 
quantities, and d) zero demand. Downward sloping demand curves are specified as constant 
elasticity function
6. To prevent integrals underneath a constant elasticity function and thus 
consumers’ surplus reach infinity, we use truncated demand curves. A truncated demand curves 
is horizontal between zero and a small quantity ( ) and downward sloping for quantities 
above  . In particular, the truncated inverse demand curve for commodity y and region 
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The second right hand side term  ( u,n INPS −  subtracts the areas 
underneath the endogenously priced input supply curves for hired labor, water, land, and animal 
grazing units. Supply curves for these inputs are specified as upward sloping constant elasticity 





. Note that the   supply variables 
are constraint by physical limits in equation block (3). Thus, when the physical limit is reached, 
the inverse supply curve becomes effectively vertical. 
                                                 
6 The GAMS version of ASMGHG contains a nonlinear and a stepwise linear representation of constant elasticity 
supply and demand functions both of which can be used. 











 account for the areas underneath the foreign inverse excess 
demand curves minus the areas underneath the foreign inverse excess supply curves. Together 
these two terms define the total trade based Marshallian consumer plus producer surplus 






















 subtract the costs of 
exogenously priced production inputs and the costs for domestic and international transportation, 
respectively. 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Potential – An Application 
  The ASMGHG model can be applied to assess the economic and environmental impacts 
of multiple technical changes to the agricultural sector, which may be policy, research, 
environmental change or otherwise induced. We chose to examine the national greenhouse gas 
abatement potential of U.S. agriculture for several reasons. First, greenhouse gas emissions 
represent a global externality. Thus, mitigation policies are likely to be implemented in the whole 
agricultural sector instead of smaller localities. Second, we had access to environmental impact 
data across the nation simulated for various alternative crop and livestock management 
strategies. Third, existing estimates of greenhouse gas abatement potential in U.S. agriculture did 
not fully incorporate opportunity costs arising from multiple strategy implementation and 
conventional agricultural activities. 
Mitigation policy simulation in the agricultural sector 
  Agricultural greenhouse mitigation policies can be designed in many different ways and 
levels of severity. We decided to use an emissions based hybrid approach between tax and 
subsidy. In particular, we assumed that farmers in each U.S. region would have to pay a tax for 
emissions equal to   and receive a subsidy for sequestration equal to ep . To implement 
this policy in ASMGHG, we expanded the objective function [equation (10)] by adding the terms 
 and  . 
EMIT
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  A second aspect of GHG mitigation policies involves the level of severity, i.e. the carbon 
price (cp) level. Carbon prices can be dictated directly by the government or emerge from a 
carbon market, which involves many sectors of the economy. To overcome uncertainties about a 
future carbon price, we picked a wide range of hypothetical price levels between zero and $500 



















, where   and 
and are greenhouse gas account specific multipliers. Particularly,   = 1 for carbon 
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7. GHG sequestration accounts in ASMGHG involve only carbon. Reflecting 
different permanence and saturation characteristics, we assigned  = 1 for biofuel based 
carbon offset accounts,   = 0.75 for afforestation based carbon accounts, and   = 0.50 









  A third aspect of agricultural mitigation policies concerns their strategy scope. Which 
activities are eligible for carbon credits? Will it be just afforestation or will it be a comprehensive 
set of agricultural activities. We decided to analyze four policy scope scenarios, where the 
carbon price imposed a) on all GHG accounts, b) on the afforestation carbon account only, c) on 
the biofuel carbon account only, and d) on the soil carbon only. The last three scenarios were 
also chosen to illustrate the difference between the single strategy economic potential and the 
competitive economic potential, where different strategies can be used simultaneously. 
  To simulate the above described mitigation policy scenarios, we set up a loop over all 
carbon price levels and over all policy scope scenarios. Inside this loop, we first assigned the 
scenario specific values of   and ep , solved ASMGHG, computed and reported 





  In interpreting our simulation results, a few qualities must be noted. First, the current 
situation is represented by the baseline scenario with all   and ep  values equal to zero. 
Second, all carbon price based abatement cost identify lower bounds because transaction costs of 
policy implementation, monitoring, and enforcement are not taken into account. Third, carbon 
prices are completely exogenous to ASMGHG. Fourth, increased utility from reduced levels of 
GHG is not included. Fifth, the same results that we obtained by using a hybrid tax subsidy 






Mitigation Strategy Adoption 
  The contribution of major agricultural GHG emission mitigation strategies is graphically 
summarized in Figure 1 through abatement curves and also listed in Table 2. Net emission 
reductions from each strategy were calculated at each incentive level as the difference between 
actual emissions and baseline emissions. Results show that the highest share on total abatement 
is provided by three basic carbon mitigation strategies: soil carbon sequestration, afforestation, 
and production of perennial energy crops for electricity generation. However, each of these 
strategies appears attractive at different carbon price ranges.  
  Soil carbon sequestration increases for carbon prices up to $50 per metric ton of carbon 
equivalent (tce) but decreases for higher prices. This occurs for two major reasons: a) for prices 
above $50 per tce, substantial amounts of cropland are either afforested or diverted to generate 
alternative biofuels. Even though these land uses will also increase soil carbon, the net emission 
savings are allocated to the afforestation account and biofuel account and not to the agricultural 
soil carbon account (to avoid double counting); and b) As carbon prices increase so do prices for 
traditional food and fiber commodities. This trend also increases farmers' incentive to produce 
higher yields even at the expense of increased emissions. For example, adoption of zero tillage 
on existing cropland sequesters less than 0.5 tce per acre and year, while growing forests or 
energy crop plantations mitigate above 1 tce per acre and year. Thus, for high carbon price levels 
                                                 
7 These values reflect the 100-year global warming potential of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. 
8 The derivation of the carbon sequestration multipliers is available from the authors. 
  11it can be more efficient to increase traditional crop yields and thus make more cropland available 
for afforestation and renewable energy. If conventional tillage produces a higher crop yield, high 
carbon prices may lead to a partial reversion of reduced tillage back to more conventional tillage.  
  Afforestation of traditional cropland increases steadily for carbon price levels between $0 
and $160 per tce. Higher incentives up to $390 per tce result in no additional gains. Energy crop 
plantations are not implemented for carbon price levels below $40 per tce but rise quickly in 
importance at higher carbon prices. The contribution of energy crop plantations and permanent 
forests illustrates the problem of direct strategy competition. Landowners must choose between 
afforestation and energy crop plantations but cannot implement both options on the same piece 
of land. Thus, while the sum of the two abatement categories increases relatively smoothly, the 
individual abatement curves display non-monotonic behavior.  
  Net emission reductions via nitrous oxide and methane mitigation strategies are relatively 
small. However, ASMGHG only contains strategies for which data are available. Introduction of 
new technologies may alter this picture and increase the total contribution of non-CO2 strategies. 
Over time, methane and nitrous oxide emission abatement may also become more important 
because they are not subject to saturation as are soil sequestration and afforestation. 
  Agriculture's total contribution to GHG emission mitigation is price sensitive as are the 
contributions of individual strategies. For a $10 per tce incentive, only about 50 million metric 
tons of carbon equivalents (mmtce) can be saved through the agricultural and forest sectors. This 
amount equals about three percent of the combined 1990 U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide, 
methane, and nitrous oxide (U.S. EPA). As carbon prices increase, so do marginal abatement 
costs. For example, an increase to $20 per tce adds 25 mmtce or about 50 percent of the $10 per 
tce contribution. It takes extremely high incentives in the neighborhood of $500 per tce to bring 
agriculture's annual contribution above 400 mmtce (Table 2).  
Measures of Potentials 
  Many estimates for the emission abatement potential of selected strategies ignore cost 
and resource competition. Lal et al. (1998), for example assess the total agricultural soil carbon 
sequestration potential, but do not specify the cost of achieving such a potential level of 
sequestration. To demonstrate the importance of economic considerations, we use our model to 
compute and compare the technical, economic, and competitive economic potential for major 
agricultural strategies (Figure 3). The total technical potential of soil carbon sequestration
9 is 125 
mmtce annually (Panel A). However, this potential is not economically feasible even under sole 
reliance on this strategy and prices as high as $500 per ton. Even at such a high price, carbon 
gains remain about 20 mmtce or 16 percent short of the maximum potential. At lower prices 
substantially less soil carbon is sequestered. Furthermore, when agricultural soil carbon 
strategies are considered simultaneously with other strategies, the carbon price stimulates at most 
70 mmtce or 56 percent of maximum potential with sequestration falling to 53 mmtce (42 
percent) at a $200 price because other strategies are more efficient at higher payment level. 
Similar observation can be made for other agricultural GHG mitigation strategies. At a 
carbon price of $200 per tce, the single strategy economic potential of biofuel carbon offsets 
(Panel B) is about two third of its technical potential while the competitive economic potential 
amounts to less than 50 percent. The economic potential of mitigation from afforestation (Panel 
                                                 
9 The technical potential was computed by replacing ASMGHG's economic surplus maximizing objective function 
with a function that maximizes soil carbon. 
  12C) achieves at $200 per tce achieves about three quarters of its technical potential under a single 
strategy assessment and about 50 percent under multi-strategy assessment.  
Regional Effects 
  While results presented so far concentrated at the national level, ASMGHG output can 
also be used to analyze regional effects (Figure 2). Soil carbon sequestration is dominant in the 
Cornbelt, the Northern Plain States, and to some extent in the Mountain States. For low carbon 
prices, the Lakes States also indicate soil carbon as the preferred option. However, for higher 
carbon prices, the Lake States offer the most cost efficient energy crop production. Between $60 
and $120 per tce, renewable fuels are produced almost exclusively in these states. Subsequently, 
the North East, Delta State, and South East regions take part. The Corn Belt region becomes 
profitable for perennial energy crops only for carbon price above $220 per tce. Possible reasons 
for such behavior may include higher opportunity cost in the agriculturally productive Corn Belt 
region. Afforestation takes place in predominantly in the Delta States but also in the North East 
States. In some regions, incentive levels above $50 per tce are needed to make afforestation 
profitable. 
Welfare Impacts 
  Welfare impacts of mitigation on agricultural sector participants are listed in Table 3. 
These impacts represent intermediate run results, which are equilibrium results after adjustment. 
Thus, producers' welfare does not include adjustment costs, which might be incurred in the short 
run after implementation of a mitigation policy. Total welfare in the agricultural sector decreases 
by roughly 8 billion dollars for every 100 dollars per tce tax increase. Moreover, consumers' 
welfare decreases about 20 billion dollars per 100 dollars per tce tax increase because of higher 
commodity prices. In contrast, producers’ welfare increases continuously as emission reductions 
become more valuable. This increase in producers' welfare is due to large welfare shifts from 
consumers. Foreign countries' welfare decreases as well; however, the reduction is not as large as 
for domestic consumers. While foreign consumers suffer from higher commodity prices due to 
lower U.S. exports, foreign producers benefit from less U.S. production. Since foreign welfare is 
aggregated over both foreign consumers and producers, the two effects offset each other 
somewhat. Note that the above welfare accounting does not include social costs or benefits 
related to diminished or enhanced levels of the GHG emission externality, and other externalities 
such as erosion and fertilizer nutrient pollution. 
Agricultural Production Sector Effects 
  Mitigation efforts in the agricultural sector impact production technologies and 
production intensities. New economic incentives and disincentives stimulate farmers to abandon 
emission intensive technologies, increase the use of mitigative technologies, and consider 
production of alternative products such as biofuel crops (Table 3). Higher costs of production 
(emission tax, opportunity costs, land rental costs) for conventional management strategies and 
higher incentives for alternatives cause farmers to shift more land to mitigative products. 
Production of conventional crops may change both due to altered crop yields and acreage shifts. 
The impact of carbon prices on production of traditional agricultural products is shown in Table 
3. Declining crop production is mainly due to less acreage allocated to traditional food crops. 
The computed Fisher Ideal Index reveals only a small response of crop yields to mitigation 
(Table 3). Initially, yields decline slightly due to less irrigation and less fertilization. 
Subsequently at higher carbon prices, average crop yields go up again. For prices above $100 per 
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and energy crop yields are not sensitive to cropland quality; hence the marginal cropland is 
diverted first increasing average yields on the remaining acreage for conventional crops. Less 
U.S. domestic food production coupled with higher prices in U.S. agricultural markets induce 
foreign countries to increase their net exports into the U.S. Livestock production decreases as a 
result of higher costs from mitigative management. Lower levels of production of traditional 
agricultural products in turn affect the market price of these products (Table 3). In particular, 
prices change considerably if the product is emission intensive, if it has a low elasticity of 
demand, and if the U.S. is a major producer. 
Other Externalities 
  Many of the GHG emission coefficients for crop production were simulated with the 
Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) system. The complex nature of this biophysical 
simulation modeling system makes it an inexpensive task to simultaneously report other 
emission coefficients along with those for GHGs. Here, we analyzed the effects of agricultural 
GHG emissions mitigation programs on water quality related externalities. Expert opinion 
suggests a possible "win-win" situation, where greenhouse gas emission mitigation also leads to 
a reduction in both soil erosion and water pollution. Simulated results from this study are listed 
in Table 2 and Table 3. The average per acre values of the other externalities decrease notably as 
carbon prices increase from $0 and $100 dollars per tce with little or no additional reductions at 
higher prices.  
Summary and Conclusions 
  We examine the potential role of agricultural GHG mitigation efforts considering the 
possible implementation of a variety of agricultural practices. Results show that U.S. agriculture 
can contribute to greenhouse gas mitigation, but total abatement potential is price sensitive. For 
low carbon equivalent prices prevalent strategies are reduced tillage systems, reduced 
fertilization, improved manure management, and some afforestation. The abatement levels being 
generated are in modest quantities relative to Kyoto Protocol like levels. As carbon equivalent 
prices increase, the abatement potential rises to about 50 percent of the original U.S. Kyoto 
Protocol target. At higher carbon prices, most of the emission abatement arises from 
afforestation/forest management and energy crop plantations diverting substantial amounts of 
cropland away from traditional commodity production. 
  Overall, a portfolio of strategies seems to be appropriate and may well bolster the 
political acceptability of mitigation efforts as the pool of potential participants widens. 
Moreover, a multi-strategy approach may facilitate the acceptance of agricultural mitigation 
policies across a regionally diverse U.S. agriculture. When comparing estimates of abatement 
potential we find substantial differences between different measures. Technical potential 
estimates such as in those in Lal et al. (1998) far overstate the economic potential of strategies 
like agricultural soil actions. Economic assessment of single strategies deviates from estimates of 
competitive economic potential especially if GHG saving incentives are high. 
  Some agriculturists oppose Kyoto Protocol like, environmental policies, arguing that 
farmers would be subjected to substantial economic losses. The results presented here do not 
justify this perspective. On the contrary, farmers are likely to experience higher earnings 
specifically in the intermediate run after adoption of mitigation technologies and market 
adjustment. The revenue losses due to an overall reduction in production caused by the 
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offset by revenue gains due to market price effects. 
  The findings from this paper provide support for expanded environmental aspects of farm 
policies. Traditionally, considerable taxpayer money has been used to support incomes, stabilize 
prices at "fair" levels via farm program, and accomplish certain environmental goals via 
programs such as CRP. Perhaps a joint GHG offset, farm income support program could be 
crafted that would give incentives to farmers for adoption of environmentally friendly 
management but also be perceived as contributing to the economy wide GHG offset program. 
  Several important limitations to this research should be noted which could be subject to 
improvement. First, the findings presented here reflect technologies for which data were 
available to us. Second, most of the greenhouse gas emission data from the traditional 
agricultural sector are based on biophysical simulation models. Thus, the accuracy of the 
estimates presented here depends on the quality of these models and the origin of associated 
simulation model input data [Antle (2001a)]. Third, not monetarized in this analysis were 
transaction costs of mitigation policies, costs or benefits from reduced levels of other agricultural 
externalities, and costs or benefits of changed income distribution in the agricultural sector. 
Fourth, we operate at a 63-region level while others [Antle et al. (2001b, 2002), Pautsch et al. 
(2001)] operate in regions over thousands of points. Insights gained from those studies could be 
integrated into more aggregate multi-strategy appraisals to expand overall results reliability.  
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Figure 1  Multi-Strategy, Economic Potential of Major Agricultural Greenhouse Gas 
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Figure 2  Differences in Regional Strategy Adoption (LS=Lake States, SE=South East 
States, CB=Cornbelt, NE=North East States, MN=Mountain States, DS=Delta States, 
NP=Northern Plain States, AP=Appalachian States, SP=Southern Plain States, PC=Pacific 
States) of Major Agricultural Mitigation Strategies for Selected Carbon Prices (20, 50, 100, and 
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Figure 3  Technical, Sole Source Economic, and Competitive Multi-Strategy Economic 
Potentials of Major Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Strategies 
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Table 1  Assessment scope of greenhouse gas abatement studies related to U.S. agriculture 
 
Study  Abatement 
Region 
Traditional 
Agriculture  Simultaneous Strategies  Analyzed Greenhouse 
Gases 
   S
a P
b T
c  CO2 CH4 N 2O 
Antle et al. (2001b)  Montana  +  +  -  Tillage, Crop to grassland  +  -  - 
Phetteplace et al. 
(1999) 
Various U.S. 
states  +  -  -  Livestock diet and pasture Management  +  +  + 
De Cara and Jayet 
(2000) 
12 EU 
countries  + - -  Animal feeding, Fertilization, Crop to 
grassland, Afforestation   + + + 
Faeth and 
Greenhalgh (2001)  U.S.  +  +  -  Tillage, Fertilization, Crop to grassland  +  -  + 
Lal et al. (1998)  U.S.  -  -  -  Tillage, Crop to grassland  +  -  - 
Parks and Hardie 
(1995)  U.S. +  -  -  Afforestation of marginal agricultural 
land  + - - 
Pautsch et al. (2001)  Iowa  +  -  -  Tillage  +  -  - 
Peters et al. (2001)  U.S.  +  +  -  Tillage, Crop to grassland  +  -  - 
This  study  U.S.  + + + 
Direct and indirect fossil fuel use, Tillage, 
Fertilization, Crop to grassland, 
Afforestation, Biofuels, Livestock diet, 
Pasture and Manure management,  
+ + + 
a Substitutability of products (+ substitutable products, - fixed level of production) 
b Commodity prices (+ endogenous, - exogenous) 
c Trade with regions outside abatement regions (+ yes, - no) Table 2  Environmental Abatement Effects at Selected Carbon Price Scenarios 
 
Carbon Equivalent price in $/metric ton C  Category 
 Sub-Category  01 02 05 0 1 0 0  2 0 0 5 0 0
GHG Abatement by Individual Strategy (Thousand Metric Tons of Carbon Equivalents) 
 Permanent  Afforestation  0 4,028 13,445 49,957 59,407 133,380 183,040
 Soil  Carbon  Storage  0 44,550 57,061 70,524 63,356 53,638 52,587
  Biomass for Power Plants  0 0 0 20,799 112,790  152,544 155,625
  Reduced Fossil Fuel Inputs  0 2,637 3,910 5,387 7,026  8,302 9,934
 Livestock  Technologies  0 37 254 4,181 8,730  11,614 17,910
  Crop Non-Carbon Strategies  0 1,129 1,302 1,747 2,920  4,148 5,308
Total GHG Emission Abatement (Million Metric Tons of Carbon Equivalents) 
 Methane  0 0.17 0.38 4.55 12.21  16.16 20.97
 Carbon  Dioxide  0 51.21 74.42 145.8 237.91  341.64 394.9
 Nitrous  Oxide  0 1 1.18 2.24 4.11  5.83 8.54
 Total  Carbon  Equivalents  0 52.38 75.97 152.6 254.23  363.63 424.4
Changes in Non-GHG Environmental Externalities on Traditional Cropland (Percent per Acre) 
 Erosion  0 -24.9 -32.27 -42.9 -45.09  -51.62 -50.31
 Nitrogen  Percolation  0 -6.91 -9.42 -15.54 -19.07  -18.61 -11.99
  Nitrogen Subsurface Flow  0 -7.13 -8.29 -10.72 -8.58 -5.24 -3.53
  Phosphor Loss in Sediment  0 -32.58 -40.66 -50.35 -49.53  -52.07 -51.61
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Table 3  Production, Market and Welfare Effects in U.S. Agriculture at Selected Carbon 
Price Scenarios 
 
Carbon Equivalent price in $/metric ton C  Category 
 Sub-Category 
Unit 
0 10  20  50  100  200  500 
Agricultural Production 
  Traditional Crops  Million Acres  325.6 323.9 320.2 307.0 270.9  229.1 191.6
 Pasture  Million  Acres  395.4 397.2 397.2 391.9 382.6  377.1 351.4
  Perennial Energy Crops  Million Acres  0.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 53.9  72.8 76.0
  New Permanent Forests  Million Acres  0.0 0.0 3.6 12.5 13.6  42.1 65.0
 Reduced  Tillage  Percent  32.71 68.04 72.73 81.05 81.43  80.96 80.02
 Irrigation  Percent  18.69 18.32 17.82 18.33 20.29  25.83 31.02
  Nitrogen Fertilizer  Million Tons  10.53 10.45 10.34 10.01 9.24 8.22 7.15
Agricultural Market Shifts 
  Crop Prices  Fisher Index  100.00 100.75 101.98 108.08 129.14  173.78 288.64
  Crop Production  Fisher Index  100.00 99.20 98.47 95.73 86.28  73.71 62.31
  Crop Net Exports  Fisher Index  100.00 97.40 94.83 87.05 59.22  29.11 20.28
  Livestock Production  Fisher Index  100.00 100.27 100.12 97.42 92.86  87.93 77.87
  Livestock Prices  Fisher Index  100.00 100.11 100.46 104.81 119.05  146.08 207.63
Changes in Agricultural Welfare 
 Ag-Sector  Welfare  Billion  $  0.00 -0.22 -0.51 -2.11 -8.78  -19.65 -36.48
 Producers  Welfare  Billion  $  0.00 0.41 0.98 4.49 13.91  32.34 79.97
 Consumers  Welfare  Billion  $  0.00 -0.44 -1.08 -5.38 -19.16  -46.71 -108.76
 Foreign  Welfare  Billion  $  0.00 -0.19 -0.41 -1.21 -3.52  -5.29 -7.69
 